Public managers’ valuation of secondary policy objectives in public procurement – results from a discrete choice experiment
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30636/jbpa.41.206Keywords:
Public procurement, Secondary policy objectives, Stated preferences, Discrete choice experiment, Random utility theoryAbstract
Governments are increasingly linking public procurement contracts to the attainment of secondary policy objectives. While not challenging the continuing dominance of price, this changes how service providers are selected. This study examines how public managers value environmental, innovative, and social goals against price in the public procurement of waste collection at the municipal level in Belgium. Using a discrete choice experiment, we study public managers’ valuation of secondary policy objectives. Additionally, to extend the external validity of our findings to different administrative structures, the same study has been replicated in three other countries (Norway, Germany, and Estonia). Although price remains crucial, we observe that public managers appear to be willing to pay more to increase the environmental, innovative, and social standards of public services.
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