


Graphics and Wording for Additional Questions and Treatments

Home Mortgage Interest Deduction



Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit

Do you favor or oppose the Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit? a. Favor strongly;


b. Favor somewhat; c. Oppose somewhat; d. Oppose strongly; e. Don't know/no opinion

Group One Treatment: Here is some information about the federal Retirement Savings

Contribution Tax Credit. This policy is a tax benefit for people who invest in private retirement plans administered by their employers. These plans include stocks, bonds, and real estate. Under this policy, people do not have to pay taxes on income they use for these investments.

Group Two Treatment: [Same statement as Group One, plus:] The people who benefit most from this policy are those who have the highest incomes. In 2000, a majority of the benefits went to people who lived in households that made \$75,000 or more that year.

Online appendix for: Guardino & Mettler (2020 JBPA), Revealing the “Hidden welfare state”: How policy information influences public attitudes about tax expenditures




Earned Income Tax Credit

Do you favor or oppose the federal Earned Income Tax Credit? a. Favor strongly; b. Favor somewhat; c. Oppose somewhat; d. Oppose strongly; e. Don't know/no opinion

Group One Treatment: Here is some information about the federal Earned Income Tax Credit.

This is a tax benefit for people who work but do not make much money. Under this policy, many people pay no taxes on their income, and some actually receive a payment from the government if their income is low enough.

Group Two Treatment: [Same as Group One, plus:] The people who benefit most from this policy are those who have low incomes. In 2004, a large majority of the benefits went to people who lived in households that made less than \$30,000 that year.



Online appendix for: Guardino & Mettler (2020 JBPA), Revealing the “Hidden welfare state”:
 How policy information influences public attitudes about tax expenditures
Additional Data and Analyses

Table A1

Summary Statistics

Age (mean)	45.82
Education	
Less than high school	13.1%
High school	32.3%
Some college	27.4%
Bachelor’s or higher	27.2%
Gender	
Male	47.7%
Female	52.3%
Income	
Low	35.9%
Middle	35.2%
High	26.9%
Race/Ethnicity	
White (non-Hispanic)	70.4%
Hispanic	12.2%
African-American (non-Hispanic)	11.1%
Other (non-Hispanic)	5.2%
More than one race (non-Hispanic)	1.1%
Ideological ID	
Extremely liberal	4.2%
Liberal	14.9%
Slightly liberal	14.7%
Moderate/middle-of-the road	35.6%
Slightly conservative	10.7%
Conservative	16.6%
Extremely conservative	3.4%
Party ID	
Strong Democrat	25.6
Not very strong Democrat	21.1
Independent – lean Democratic	8.8
Independent	8.2
Independent – lean Republican	6.3
Not very strong Republican	15.3
Strong Republican	14.7

Online appendix for: Guardino & Mettler (2020 JBPA), Revealing the “Hidden welfare state”:
How policy information influences public attitudes about tax expenditures

Table A2

Balance Tests	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	
Age (mean)	45.54	46.48	45.45	$F = .222; p = .881$
Education				$X_2 = .060; p = 1.00$
Less than high school	13.5%	12.4%	13.4%	
High school	31.8%	32.8%	32.4%	
Some college	27.6%	27.7%	26.8%	
Bachelor’s or higher	27.1%	27.1%	27.4%	
Gender				$X_2 = .071; p = .965$
Male	48.5%	47.5%	47.2%	
Female	51.5%	52.5%	52.8%	
Income				$X_2 = 2.404; p = .662$
Low	36.3%	33.3%	38.0%	
Middle	39.8%	38.4%	33.5%	
High	24.0%	28.2%	28.5%	
Race/Ethnicity				$X_2 = 7.729; p = .460$
White (non-Hispanic)	69.4%	73.9%	68.0%	
Hispanic	11.8%	10.8%	14.0%	
African-American (non-Hispanic)	12.5%	11.9%	9.0%	
Other (non-Hispanic)	5.3%	2.3%	7.9%	
More than one race (non-Hispanic)	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	
Ideological ID				$X_2 = 18.328; p = .106$
Extremely liberal	3.0%	4.8%	4.6%	
Liberal	16.5%	9.5%	18.5%	
Slightly liberal	11.0%	14.3%	18.5%	
Moderate/middle-of-the road	39.0%	33.9%	34.1%	
Slightly conservative	11.6%	11.3%	9.2%	
Conservative	17.1%	20.2%	12.7%	
Extremely conservative	1.8%	6.0%	2.3%	
Party ID_a				$X_2 = 34.975; p = .000$
Strong Democrat	22.8%	23.0%	30.6%	
Not very strong Democrat	21.5%	22.4%	19.4%	
Independent – lean Democratic	4.4%	6.2%	15.3%	
Independent	11.4%	11.8%	1.8%	
Independent – lean Republican	6.3%	6.8%	5.9%	
Not very strong Republican	20.9%	12.4%	12.9%	
Strong Republican	12.7%	17.4%	14.1%	

Table A3

Support for Home Mortgage Interest Deduction After Receiving Distributive Information

High income	.615	**
	(.178)	
Low income	-.461	**
	(.163)	
White	-.148	
	(.156)	
Republican	.091	
	(.228)	
Democrat	-.485	*
	(.210)	
Male	-.174	
	(.135)	
Bachelor’s or higher	.596	***
	(.161)	
Age	.002	
	(.004)	
Constant	2.218	***
	(.301)	
N	354	
Adjusted R ₂	.212	

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Data are from an online survey-experiment conducted in February 2008. Constant represents a 46-year-old non-white, middle-income, independent woman with less than a bachelor’s degree. *** p<.001 ** p<.01; * p<.05.

Table A4

Support for Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit After Receiving Distributive

Information

High income	.386	*
	(.173)	
Low income	-.162	
	(.159)	
Republican	.052	
	(.222)	
Democrat	-.616	**
	(.205)	
White	-.293	
	(.152)	
Male	.144	
	(.132)	
Bachelor’s or higher	.752	***
	(.157)	
Age	.005	
	(.004)	
Constant	2.228	***
	(.294)	
N	354	
Adjusted R ₂	.166	

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Data are from an online survey-experiment conducted in February 2008. Constant represents a 46-year-old, non-white, middle-income, independent woman with less than a bachelor’s degree. *** p<.001 ** p<.01; * p<.05.

Figure A1

Post-Test Policy Favorability: Home Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction




Figure A2

Post-Test Policy Favorability: Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit





Figure A3

Post-Test Policy Favorability: Earned Income Tax Credit



^a When the measure is collapsed into a three-category variable, combining groups 2 and 3 (whose treatments consisted of distributive information on each policy) eliminates significant differences in partisanship between subjects who received basic information only and those who received distributive information ($X^2 = 5.6$; $p = .061$).